Standing Committee E

[Derek Conway in the Chair]

Housing Bill

Keith Hill: On a point of order, Mr. Conway. As a courtesy, I take this opportunity to mention something that Committee members will be glad to hear. In the next few days, we propose to introduce Government amendments to make a limited number of changes to park homes regulation. We expect to table clauses as set out in the private Member's Bill that was not taken up. We are working out the final details, so the amendments will be tabled during the recess.
 I undertake to send each Committee member a copy of the amendments on the day of tabling. I will also write to other Members with an interest, including members of the all-party parliamentary group on park home owners, and to those who spoke about the issue on Second Reading, not least my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson), who has campaigned so indefatigably on the issue.

Derek Conway: I am grateful to the Minister for his courtesy.

John Hayes: Further to that point of order, Mr. Conway. The Minister has imparted a very desirable piece of information to the Committee. He will be conscious of the new clause tabled by the Opposition on precisely that subject. I feel confident that that new clause will loom large in the Minister's mind as he goes on to write his own amendments.Clause 153 Right to buy: information

Clause 153 - Right to buy: information

Question proposed [this day], That the clause stand part of the Bill. 
 Question again proposed.

Matthew Green: I was talking about sewage when the Committee adjourned this morning.
 I welcome what the Minister has said. He may have noticed that my hon. Friends and I have added our names to the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre. I add to the Minister's praise for the work that he has done on the issue. I look forward to some cross-party consensus. It is a shame that the Conservatives have tabled a separate amendment, rather than joining the all-party one. 
 I was using sewage as an example of why it is important to provide better information to tenants before they take up their right to buy. The hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr. 
 Hayes) accused me of trying to discourage people from taking up their right to buy. He fundamentally misunderstands the point. People are taking up the right without understanding that—often because of shared facilities—they have ongoing costs; that in certain circumstances they will have to pay the local authority or the housing association; and that if they try to make changes to their property, such as the sewage change that I outlined, there may well be restrictions on what they can do. Many tenants do not understand the restrictions and would be better placed to make decisions about the viability of taking up the right to buy and the future liabilities that they might have, if such information were up front. 
 For those reasons, I join the absent hon. Member for Bolton, South-East (Dr. Iddon) and warmly support the clause. I hope that the Minister is not discouraged by the Conservatives from ploughing ahead with it.

Sydney Chapman: In no way do I oppose the new clause, which adds a section to the Housing Act 1985. It is a very good addendum to it. However, the precautionary principle comes into play here. To what degree and in what circumstances will the Government use the proposed new section in giving information? How will they apply it, and what is in it?
 I want to pick up on comments made by the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East, to whom I always listen with interest. He talked about how people had suffered as a result of systems building and about whether he blamed the landlord, housing association or the council on one hand, or the naivety of tenants on the other. Although I know that he is speaking absolutely sincerely and with integrity on his experiences in Bolton, there are people who have had other experiences—people who wanted to, and did, exercise their right to buy when they had a new system-type building, if I may use that shorthand. 
 In some cases, the tenant who exercised his right to buy had no idea that the structure of his property could in any way be defective. It could be argued that he should have obtained a detailed survey—and, in my experience, it sometimes requires a detailed survey to show what is going on with the material being used, because it cannot necessarily be seen from the outside. However, someone could buy in good faith, not believing that there was any reason why he would have problems later. 
 I know of instances, too, in which the local housing authority did not know that there was anything defective, or potentially defective, about some of the types of systems building used, so one cannot level the finger of suspicion, or worse, at the local housing authority. Indeed, the problem has sometimes been manufactured by building societies, which may take it upon themselves to refuse a mortgage on the property, thus making it of much less value, if not worthless. I am not arguing about whether the building societies were right to do so; I am just saying that they did it. If a building society refuses to give a mortgage for a building, other building societies usually follow suit.
 My final point, to restore the balance—because those problems would have happened regardless of the right to buy—is that if the tenant had not exercised his right to buy the property, and the property was subsequently found to be defective, the local authority would have been landed with a thundering bill. I am merely trying to take a slightly different approach, instead of repeating the sincere castigations of the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East about naive tenants, the original landlord or—I would have mentioned these, because sometimes there is a slight criticism to be made about them—some of the building societies and the systems buildings for which they refuse to lend money.

John Hayes: This apparently anodyne clause has stimulated an interesting debate. Although the clause is bland, inasmuch as it simply talks about information that might be made available, contributions to this short debate have revealed a worrying series of signs that suggest that some see the clause as a vehicle to deter people from exercising their right. People should have good, empirical information at their disposal so that they know about the house that they are planning to buy and the responsibilities that they are taking on.
 Given that many who exercise the right to buy are becoming home owners for the first time, it is worrying that some local authorities—and, I say with some sadness, some members of the Committee—are not, in my judgment, fully committed to the right to buy. In them, there is a lurking uncertainty about the policy. They see the clause as a vehicle to provide people with information that might well deter them from exercising that right. We heard the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East drawing on perfectly proper local experiences but sounding—as I said just before we broke for our sumptuous lunches—rather like Jeremiah. We had talk of famine and invasion, perhaps not literally but certainly metaphorically. I worry about the support that he received from the hon. Member for Ludlow (Matthew Green), whose party is not enthusiastic about the right to buy, it must be said; it has a bad track record on the subject, as he knows. [Interruption.] He shrugs his shoulders, but in 2002 the former Liberal Democrat housing spokesman, the hon. Member for Torbay (Mr. Sanders), called for no ''more sell offs'', and it is Liberal Democrat policy to limit the maximum discount under the right to buy to 25 per cent. of the value of the property, so we know that the Liberal Democrats are not sympathetic. The support that the hon. Member for Ludlow has given the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East leads me to believe that clause 153, which is apparently helpful, could be used by people who do not want the right to buy to be maintained, to deter people who could be relatively inexperienced in the business of purchasing homes. 
 I have considerable doubts about the clause. It gives enormous powers not to the Minister, but to his boss, the Secretary of State, to define precisely the 
 information that will be supplied to tenants; nothing specific is in the Bill. It says that by order of the Secretary of State 
''such matters as are specified'' 
should be made available in the form of information for potential tenants. That gives extraordinary scope to the Secretary of State.

Matthew Green: The hon. Gentleman is getting rather carried away. I wonder whether he can answer the question in reverse. Does he want tenants to buy something without adequate information being made available to them as to the condition and costs that might be attached to purchasing the property? Is he saying that tenants should be kept in the dark? That appears to be his position.

John Hayes: I do not think that the vast bulk of people who have purchased houses over the past 20-odd years under the right to buy would claim that they had been kept in the dark. Most of them would not say that they had had a disappointing interface with home ownership. For the most part, I do not think that they would argue that they would have been in a better position had the 1985 Act contained this clause.
 There are exceptions. The hon. Member for Bolton, South-East rightly drew our attention to that small number of cases where there have been significant structural problems; issues might reasonably have been foreseen and people may have purchased homes that have subsequently caused them difficulties, but those homes make up a tiny fraction of those that have been purchased under the right to buy. 
 My point, which was clearly lost on the hon. Member for Ludlow, who became preoccupied with sewers and cesspits before we broke for lunch, is that if the information that was provided to people about the house was objective, empirical and factual, that might allow them to make a balanced judgment. However, if the information was less than that, it might impact on people's assessment of their purchase and the feelings about whether their purchase was desirable, to such an extent that they would be likely to be deterred. 
 The matter is entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State, as the Bill does not specify what should be provided. It does not even say that the information should be fair and balanced; it certainly does not list the facts, to which the hon. Member for Ludlow referred and about which people should reasonably be informed before they purchase a property. The Bill simply says that all of this will be specified in an order made by the Secretary of State. Perhaps that would not have worried us had we not heard from some Committee members, who were less than sympathetic to the principle of right to buy, that they see the clause as a vehicle for making all kinds of information available that would, in practice, deter a number of people. [Interruption.] Again the hon. Gentleman shrugs his shoulders, but there are real fears that the number of people exercising the right to buy will be detrimentally affected by the Bill. Those fears have been expressed to me, and I am sure that they must have been expressed to him.
 The Minister has assured us that that is not his intention. He has clearly said—[Interruption.] I do not know whether the hon. Member for Ludlow wants to intervene again; perhaps he wants to charm us with another of his exciting anecdotes about Ludlow.

Matthew Green: No.

John Hayes: He does not. Given that there is no suggestion or detail of what will be included, we need to know what guidance will be given about the information that is to be provided to tenants.
 Those are my worries about the clause. I am not planning to oppose it, but I should have thought that the hon. Gentleman would want such information to be made clear. I am therefore surprised that he has not risen to support the sensible points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) and, I hope, myself. They were made in the fair-minded and even-handed way that one might expect of a responsible Member.

Keith Hill: I will deal with the extraordinary observations that we have just been treated to by the hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings in a moment. First, I will address the other matters that have been raised.
 I do not propose to follow the hon. Member for Ludlow down the path of sewage, but his point was well taken. There is an issue about ongoing costs and shared costs, and would-be right-to-buy-ers should be made aware of them. 
 The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet, who is my old jousting companion in these Committees, talked about the problem of tenants buying system-built houses. He made a fair point. However, I emphasise that we do not want to get into a blame culture. I imagined that the hon. Gentleman would be aware of problems with system-built properties. As he was speaking, my mind went to a development in the Arkley estate in his constituency where there were profound problems to do with system building. My recollection is that those blocks were colloquially known locally as Alcatraz. 
 In case the Committee is somewhat baffled by my intimacy with the hon. Gentleman's constituency, I should explain that I lived there for many years. Indeed, I was the secretary of the Chipping Barnet Labour party, and a candidate in the 1978 local elections for the Arkley ward.

Sydney Chapman: As the Minister has addressed a constituency matter, I want to put the record straight. The estate was not the Arkley estate but the Dollis Valley estate, and it is colloquially known as Alcatraz not because of the way that it was constructed, but because of its generally unbeautiful appearance in the landscape—it is almost on a flood plain.
 We are thrilled that such a distinguished person as the Minister spent some of his life in our constituency. Three other colleagues and myself lived almost within 200 yd of each other—at different times, I hasten to 
 add. Therefore, I am thinking of getting the name of the road involved changed from Ravenscroft park to either the Sydney Chapman memorial drive or Parliamentarians' leap.

Keith Hill: The hon. Gentleman has reminded me of my fond days in Barnet. As we always say, once a Barnetonian, always a Barnetonian.
 I will try to reassure the hon. Gentleman on the issue of tenants' purchase of dwellings in system-built buildings. Under section 125 of the Housing Act 1985, landlords must provide tenants with, among other things, a notice describing the condition of the property and any defects known to the landlord. The Government's excellent booklet for tenants, ''Your Right to Buy Your Home'', published by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, has since the 1980s recommended them to have a professional survey of the property. Clause 153 builds on those safeguards. 
 I put that on the record because that point was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, South-East in an excellent speech in which he displayed all of his vast authority and expertise on these matters and gave a warm welcome to these provisions. That is more than I can say for the hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings. To my genuine amazement, he expressed considerable doubts about the purposes of the clause. I emphatically say to him that it is not about deterrence. It is not designed to deter folk from buying their council homes. It is simply to ensure that if and when they do, all relevant information is available to them. I am certain that every Committee member has experience of constituents going down the right-to-buy path and subsequently shouldering large expenses that they had not anticipated. The information that is likely to be provided under these arrangements will include, for example, the costs of buying and maintaining a property, stamp duty, fees and insurance, and repairs and maintenance, including service charges payable by those who have bought their flats. It is not about deterrence; it is about the provision of information. I am amazed that the hon. Gentleman has doubts about these further consumer protection measures that the Government are advancing. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 153 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 154 - Termination of rent to mortgage scheme

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Robert Syms: The Minister said first thing this morning that the Government wanted to end the rent to mortgage scheme, because it was not a great success and only a limited number of people took it up. Under the clause the termination date falls eight months after the Bill receives Royal Assent. Is that to allow those who have set out on that path to convert to a mortgage?
 I should like some reassurance from the Minister that if the scheme is to end, those who have already determined that that is the way they want to go will have the opportunity to buy, and the cut-off will not occur before they get to that point.

Keith Hill: The grace period of eight months after Royal Assent is designed to allow existing tenants who are eligible to buy under the rent to mortgage scheme to do so.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 154 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 158 to 164 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 146 - Extension of introductory tenancies

Matthew Green: I beg to move amendment No. 436, in
clause 146, page 97, leave out line 6.
 This is a simple probing amendment. Can the Minister explain why the words in subsection (3), 
 ''Nothing in the following provisions affects the generality of this power'', 
are included?

Keith Hill: The amendment, proposed so succinctly by the hon. Gentleman, seeks to restrict the powers of the Secretary of State to make provision by regulation on the procedures to be followed in connection with the review of the decision to extend an introductory tenancy. That would restrict the provision for the review procedure only to those matters that appear in the Bill. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman intends to give tenants certainty as to their rights. However, preventing the Secretary of State from setting out procedures in secondary legislation restricts the tenant's rights to those contained in the Bill.
 Although specific examples are given in subsection (4), the words that the amendment seeks to remove are included just to make it clear that the Secretary of State has the power to set out more detailed procedures in secondary legislation. That formulation is consistent with section 129 of the Housing Act 1996, which concerns reviews of the decision to end an introductory tenancy. The purpose of the review procedure is to ensure that the tenant is given a fair hearing before any final decision is made regarding the extension of their introductory tenancy. To restrict the Secretary of State's ability to regulate in that area may hamper the ability of the process to safeguard that outcome. 
 The procedure for reviewing the extension of an introductory tenancy is likely to be based on the procedure for ending an introductory tenancy. This procedure has recently been upheld as compliant with the European convention on human rights by the Court of Appeal in the case of McLellan and approved by the House of Lords in the case of Begum.
 The decision to evict is taken by the landlord following a statutory process. Tenants have the right to request a review of the decision and if still not satisfied the tenant may seek judicial review as to whether the decision to end the tenancy was unreasonable. At the possession hearing the courts only consider whether the appropriate procedure was followed, and do not consider the facts on which the landlord's decision was based, or the merits of its decision. 
 I hope I have explained the purposes of the clause in those few brief remarks, and I therefore implore the hon. Member for Ludlow to withdraw his amendment.

Matthew Green: I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I will not trouble the Committee with a long explanation of my problems with this approach to dealing with introductory tenancies and other things. I did that when I served on the Committee of the Anti-social Behaviour Bill, where we were alone among the parties in worrying about some of the ways in which this power could be used. I will not go over that debate now. I was seeking a clarification from the Minister as to why he had framed it in that way. I find that reasonably satisfactory and it is probably helpful that it is on the record. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 146 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 155 - Secure tenancies: withholding of consent to mutual exchange

Amendments made: No. 427A, in 
clause 155, page 107, line 22, leave out 'or' and insert— 
 'an anti-social behaviour order under section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37); or'. 
No. 402, in 
clause 155, page 107, line 24, leave out '43' and insert '91'.—[Keith Hill.] 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

John Hayes: I wonder if the Minister might explain a little more fully? The clause affects schedule 3 of the Housing Act 1985, but looking at that schedule, the Government's thinking in the proposed changes is not clear. I am not being partisan; I simply wonder why they felt the existing provisions were not sufficient.

Keith Hill: Clause 155 introduces a new antisocial behaviour ground on which a landlord of a secure tenant may refuse an application for a mutual exchange. Mutual exchanges occur when two tenants of social landlords swap homes by legally assigning their tenancies to one another. The permission of the landlords of both tenants is required. In the case of secure tenants, that may be refused only if at least one of the grounds set out in schedule 3 of the Housing Act 1985—the schedule to which the hon. Gentleman alludes—is met. Clause 155 allows an application to be refused if a relevant injunction against antisocial
 behaviour or a suspended possession order on grounds of nuisance is enforced against either of the tenants who wish to exchange, or against a person who resides with either of them. It also allows an application to be refused if court action is pending in respect of a relevant injunction against antisocial behaviour, a possession order on the grounds of nuisance, or a demotion order.
 The purpose of the Bill is to allow social landlords better to manage their stock by preventing concentrations of antisocial tenants in particular areas. Problems can be worsened when people who behave antisocially are permitted to move closer to their antisocial friends or relatives. In many cases, those people are already frequent visitors to the area and are known by other tenants and residents to cause problems. Landlord-tenant relationships in the area may be severely undermined when the landlord proves unable to prevent an exchange. We believe also that the measure may be useful in individual cases, for example, where a landlord wants to continue to monitor a tenant's behaviour in their existing property, thereby facilitating the rehabilitation of antisocial tenants—a cause that I suspect is close to the hon. Gentleman's heart. 
 I should like to mention the city that is so successfully and effectively represented by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, North (Mr. Rooney), where there has been good experience of early intervention in cases of antisocial tenants. By dint of that early intervention, working with tenants and engaging them in mentoring exercises, quite extraordinary success has been achieved in limiting antisocial behaviour. The concept is interesting: a social landlord might in certain circumstances wish to retain a troublesome tenant in a locality. That is one of the considerations reflected in the proposals.

John Hayes: I see the purpose more clearly now, but I have two queries. First, as I understand the matter, the provisions would allow an exchange to be prevented if a member of the family of the tenant was subject to one of the orders that he listed. If so, I am concerned about the impact of that on the tenant's rights, so perhaps the Minister will flesh out that point. Secondly, I think that the Minister said that the provisions would apply not only to people on whom an order had been served, but to those against whom an action was pending. Is there not a potential problem with people being treated as guilty before that assumption is tested? I am not a big advocate of endless civil liberties, as my hon. Friends know, but that issue is worth closer examination.

Keith Hill: The answer to the hon. Gentleman's first question, which was about whether the provisions would apply in the event of antisocial behaviour action and conditions having been applied to a member of the family, is that they certainly would apply and would be effected in the manner that I described. His second question was, in a sense, about whether we are proposing through the measure to add a punishment to tenants. That is the wrong approach to the clause.
 The power proposed in the clause is not about punishment, but about allowing the landlord to manage his or her stock effectively in the interests of the tenants and the surrounding community. If the tenant's behaviour improves, they can apply again; there is clear provision for that. If the landlord is satisfied that there are no longer any housing management concerns, he or she may be prepared to consent to an exchange.

Matthew Green: I think that the Minister might want to refer the hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings to what the Conservative spokesperson said in deliberations on the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003. The Conservatives were desperate for such powers to be granted—they even wanted to go further than the Government were prepared to go. I would have welcomed some support for my cautious approach, and if the hon. Gentleman had been a member of that Committee, I might have received more support than the Conservatives who were gave me. The Minister might want to recommend that the hon. Gentleman read Hansard from that Committee.

Keith Hill: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. Of course I recommend that the hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings reads the Hansard report of that Committee, especially if it contains the words of the hon. Member for Ludlow, to whom I am grateful for drawing attention to potential inconsistencies in official Opposition policy. However, I certainly do not want to get sucked down that path. We on this side of the House have bucked such petty, partisan strife.

Andrew Selous: I understand the purpose of clause 155, which is designed not to reward tenants who have behaved antisocially. However, will the Minister comment on the clause's effect on the neighbours of the tenants whom it will prevent from moving? The neighbours may hope that the tenants in question will move out of the area because they are making their lives a misery. Will the Minister comment on the view that the clause cuts both ways?

Keith Hill: The hon. Gentleman should bear in mind that action against individuals on antisocial behaviour grounds will almost certainly be taken because of the complaints of their neighbours. We would expect effective sanctions to be applied, and the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 and this Bill contain a range of sanctions to deal with such tenants.
 The hon. Gentleman painted a scenario in which neighbours would be only too delighted to see the back of troublesome neighbours, but he will accept that while an authority is in the process of taking action against a group of tenants, a serious effort should be made to mitigate their antisocial behaviour. I also ask the hon. Gentleman to consider the implications for the community that receives the troublesome tenants. It cuts both ways. I remind him that there are many circumstances in which authorities and social 
 landlords are keen to pursue and complete a process of at least trying to rehabilitate tenants who have behaved badly. 
 I may be able to answer one of the questions asked by the hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings. He asked whether action could be taken if action on antisocial grounds was pending. The answer is yes, but if the order is subsequently not granted, the exchange can go ahead. In such a situation, orders would have to be in the process of being obtained and evidence would have to have been granted. 
 To the hon. Member for South-West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous), I say that we are discussing a discretionary power. A landlord may want to keep a tenant not for support, but to take eviction action. There is a range of choices, and we do not want to be prescriptive about the course of action that a landlord should take. The Bill offers both powers and discretion to the local authority.

John Hayes: I am grateful to the Minister, whose response has been clear and reasonable. The scenario that I imagine might cause problems is one in which middle-aged or elderly parents have a delinquent child. If that child were subject to an antisocial behaviour order, although the parents are the tenants, they would effectively be prevented from making an exchange because of that child. That is not a fanciful or uncommon scenario, as hon. Members will know from local experience. Is that a reasonable restriction on the rights of such parents?
 The Minister has made it clear that there is a degree of discretion and that the powers will be used sensitively, which has alleviated some of my concerns. However, considering the scenario that I described, he will understand why I asked the questions. Having looked at the original Housing Act 1985 and at clause 155, I was anxious to discover from the Minister the Government's thinking, but he has made it perfectly clear.

Matthew Green: For once—I do not say it lightly—I wish that the hon. Gentleman had been a Conservative spokesman on the Anti-social Behaviour Bill Committee, because his point was exactly the point made by the Liberal Democrats, who, sadly, had no support from the Conservatives on that Committee. I have the advantage of being the only member of this Committee who served on that Bill. I hope that the Conservatives are not trying to send one message in one set of circumstances and a different one in other circumstances. [Hon. Members: ''What about your party?''] We have genuine concerns about the powers in the Anti-social Behaviour Bill and their knock-on effect in other areas. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating when the proposals are implemented and we see how local authorities use them. They could be viewed as draconian powers that, if its mind were set on it, a local authority could use in a pretty unpleasant way and that will affect people who were not themselves a direct cause of antisocial behaviour.
 I will not divide the Committee on the clause because I think these battles were fought and lost in the Anti-social Behaviour Bill Committee. However, I welcome the Conservatives' conversion in the intervening six months.

John Hayes: This is a narrow but interesting point, but I must prevent the hon. Gentleman from continually ascribing to me the ideas and comments of my colleagues. He is apt to refer to my wide-ranging and benign influence on the Conservative party, but I am not responsible for everything that everyone in the Conservative party says at all times—although, such is my self- confidence, I wish that I were. The hon. Gentleman must understand that I was asking a specific, probing question to induce a particular response from the Minister, which he sensibly gave. Enough has been said; we do not want to go back to Ludlow and those nasty anecdotes.

Matthew Green: I had not even begun any nasty anecdotes. I will not pursue the matter further. The fact that the Conservative Front Bench teams do not talk to each other is probably well established, so I do not need to continue that theme.

Derek Conway: I think so too.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 155, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 156 - Right to buy: suspension of landlord's obligation to complete

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

John Hayes: This is another important clause, although it should not detain us for long. The clause suspends the landlord's obligation to complete. It is clear that section 138 of the 1985 Act was included to ensure that recalcitrant landlords who might drag their feet in conveying a freehold or granting a lease would be unable to do so. Clause 156 loosens that constraint upon landlords. My passionate desire to fight for the interests of tenants who wish to take the step of becoming home owners causes me to probe the Minister about precisely why the Government feel that loosening the constraints on landlords is necessary and desirable. I know the Minister will deal with the matter in his usual conscientious and courteous fashion, and I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Ludlow will want to speak, too.
Matthew Green rose—

Derek Conway: Mr. Green.

John Hayes: He does!

Matthew Green: In the last two clauses, I have established the Conservative party's position, which is that antisocial tenants are awful, must be cracked down on, and perhaps evicted under the Anti-social
 Behaviour Act 2003. However, if those tenants want to buy their houses, they should not be prevented from so doing. Conservative Members have set out their clear position, but it is not one with which we agree.

Keith Hill: I am slightly surprised by the tack adopted by the hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings. I suppose that it is a reflection not of his compassionate Conservatism, but of his free-market Conservatism. For a change, I shall try to answer him in a fairly spontaneous fashion, although with the usual sources of inspiration solidly behind me. The direction set out in my notes is, ''Why not go further? Why have the Government been so feeble in making such proposals?'', whereas he raised a question mark over whether we should take action at all.
 Clause 156 prevents a tenant from being able to compel his landlord to complete a right-to-buy sale if the landlord is taking action against him for antisocial behaviour. It applies if an application is pending for a demotion order or a possession order on grounds of nuisance. I say to the hon. Gentleman that the landlord can already suspend for rent arrears, but a right-to-buy sale can be processed as normal, although it must not be completed if antisocial behaviour proceedings are pending. If those proceedings fail, the RTB sale can proceed at the original valuation. He seems to think that we are going a long way already, but an unintended consequence of the obligation to complete a right-to-buy sale can be that it causes a race between the tenant trying to complete the sale and the landlord attempting to evict the tenant. Often, the right-to-buy purchase is completed more quickly than the possession proceedings and the tenant escapes the consequences of his errant behaviour.

Matthew Green: Does the Minister agree that antisocial behaviour by a tenant is just as antisocial as antisocial behaviour by a home owner? Although I might not agree with the thrust of the Government's Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, I accept that there should be consistency between the two measures. Clearly, Conservative Members do not accept that.

Keith Hill: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. He will recognise that in both the 2003 Act and the Bill, we are attempting to equalise the terrain between all social landlords so that appropriate action can be taken in respect of tenants who engage in antisocial behaviour.

John Hayes: On the grounds of consistency and of equalising the Government's approach, would the clause apply if the order were served against a member of the tenant's family, as was the case under the previous clause?

Keith Hill: No, apparently it would not.
 Let me conclude by saying to the hon. Gentleman that, if no order were made, the landlord's obligation to complete the sale would be restored. In some instances, the right-to-buy scheme is giving tenants who behave antisocially a means of escaping the consequences of their action. Our purpose of the provisions is to prevent antisocial tenants from 
 escaping such consequences because they complete the purchase of their home before the landlord can take effective action against them. That is an entirely reasonable proposition.

Clive Betts: To prevent uncertainty, I wish to return to the point raised in the intervention of the hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings. Presumably, the clause would apply when the order for possession was based on the antisocial behaviour of a member of the tenant's family and thus put at risk the tenancy.

Keith Hill: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I am grateful to him for securing that clarification.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 156 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 157 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 165 - Succession to certain tenancies by same sex partners

Matthew Green: I beg to move amendment No. 441, in
clause 165, page 117, line 10, at end insert—
'(2A) For the purposes of this paragraph, a sibling shall be treated in the same way as the original tenant's spouse if the sibling was living with the original tenant.'.
 The amendment seeks to do something that I believe was mentioned by the hon. Member for Worthing, West (Peter Bottomley) on Second Reading. He was right to raise the issue with which it deals. In line with other legislation now under consideration, the Bill seeks to include in the terms of tenancies arrangements for the succession rights of unmarried couples, whether they are of the same sex or different sexes. 
 Another set of circumstances is that of elderly people of the generation that found after the second world war that there were not enough men to go round, and in which unmarried sisters therefore took to living together. This is a generational matter; I know of a number of cases in my constituency of elderly sisters who have lived together for many years. In some cases, they are joint tenants, so the problem will not arise, but in others one of them is the tenant and the other has merely been living with them. There could be brothers in that situation as well, but my experience is that it more often involves sisters. 
 The object of the amendment is to ensure that there is no discrimination between such relationships and those of a sexual nature. The wording of the Bill seems to suggest that one has rights so long as one is having sex with somebody. The amendment seeks to extend those rights to people who are not in a sexual relationship but have clearly been living together in a sibling relationship for a considerable time. I am glad that the hon. Member for Worthing, West raised the matter; I might not have tabled the amendment if I had not been prompted by his words on Second Reading. I am sure that the Government will consider the issue, 
 and I suspect that the amendment is not the best way of dealing with it, as the wording is not very good. The Minister will probably tell me—

Sydney Chapman: I accept that the hon. Gentleman did not have an expert to advise him on how to draft the amendment, but I am anxious to get at what he is proposing. Would he propose a qualifying period for the sibling who remains when her sister dies, to use his example? Is he saying that so long as the sibling is living in the property at that moment, she should have full rights? Or is he proposing, as I suspect he should, that there should at least be a qualification requiring that the sibling should have been living in the property for a year or some other period?

Matthew Green: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. I have not tried to write all the detail into the measure; I am trying to get the Government to do that—[Interruption.] Yes, perhaps it could be done through regulations. I agree that the detail needs to be fleshed out, but I am using this opportunity to raise the matter again so that the Minister, who gave a sympathetic response on Second Reading and acknowledged that this was an issue, has the chance to return to it with a properly drafted amendment. Such an amendment might propose enabling regulations to deal with the problem. It would be remiss of the Committee to fail to take the opportunity to deal with it.

Clive Betts: First, may I say that I am very supportive of the clause? I spoke in favour of a similar measure many years ago when I served on another Committee considering a housing Bill. On that occasion, although the issue was raised and an amendment was tabled, the Government of the day unfortunately rejected the proposal.
 I also have quite a bit of sympathy with the specific point raised by the hon. Member for Ludlow. I have experienced exactly the same situation, again with two sisters, as it happens, who live in a property and feel uncertainty no matter what letters they get from the local authority saying, ''It'll be alright if one of you dies.'' Sometimes, it is not very reassuring if someone does not have the force of law behind them. 
 I wonder whether the Government might at some point look comprehensively at the issue of succession to see whether it needs sorting out, as anomalies are still around. Another such situation involves the child of a tenant who has lived in the family home all their life and has never moved out. When such a child's parents die, they might suddenly find—by then, they could be in their 50s or 60s—that they do not have a right to succeed. Again, we had a debate on that issue during consideration of a previous housing Bill, and it was clear that there were quite a few anomalies. 
 As I understand it, if someone has lived with their parents for their whole life, they may have the right to succeed in certain circumstances. It was previously common for only the man to be named on the tenancy agreement, and for the wife not to be named as a tenant. If the wife died first and the man remained a 
 tenant but then died, the child living with him had a right to succeed, because that would be a first succession. However, if as often happened, the man was a tenant and died first, the first succession went to the wife; that was automatic. When the wife died and left a child, however, the child was in second succession and so did not have the right to succeed in law. That is a complete anomaly. 
 I know that we can also throw up the issue of under-occupancy. The person in question might well have a three-bedroomed house, and there might be a shortage of such properties. However, it must be anomalous that whether the child can succeed depends on whether their mother or father died first. That is the law as it stands at present, and it is complete nonsense. 
 I know that, when the matter was previously considered, the then Minister with responsibility for housing, the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Mr. Curry), issued guidance to local authorities saying that they should exercise discretion in such circumstances and look closely at the possibility of awarding succession. The guidance also advised that that should be made clear to people in advance to relieve any stress that they might feel about the possibility of losing their family home once their parents had died. 
 However, that was only guidance, and it is not applied in all cases. Many local authorities do not even know that it exists. It has been filed away in some dark corner since the 1960s and forgotten, and it is not applied in practice. Certainly, when people come to inquire at the local housing office desk, the staff look at the rules and see that they do not contain such advice. They decide that the issue is something for the policy wonks up in head office to look at and do not give the correct advice there and then to the people who have come to seek it. 
 The issue raises many problems. I hope that the Minister will agree at least to conduct a review of the succession issue to see whether we can sort out some of the anomalies, because they are serious problems for people sitting in a home in which they have lived for an awful long time. Such people will regard where they live as their home and worry that it may not remain their home when the tenant dies.

Andrew Selous: I support the hon. Gentleman's remarks 100 per cent. I recently had a constituency case in which the ''no two succession'' rule, which is what he is talking about, came into play. The case involved a gentleman in his 50s who had lived for, I think, 40 years in a property with his parents—exactly the situation that the hon. Gentleman mentioned. The man's father had been the original tenant. His father died first and his mother succeeded to the tenancy. That was the first succession, so he had no right to stay in the property.
 Perhaps the one area that we could look at—the hon. Gentleman also raised it—is cases in which the son or daughter lived in a very large property while there was great housing need in the area. In such cases, perhaps the local housing authority should have discretion to see whether it can find a suitable property 
 in the same area, but with fewer bedrooms, in order to free up the original property for a family that needs more bedrooms. 
 None the less, the hon. Gentleman is quite right to raise the issue. He has done the Committee a service, and I very much hope that the Minister will take the point on board and seriously consider tabling an amendment before the end of our proceedings.

John Hayes: The points made by the hon. Member for Ludlow and proposed in the amendment seem well made. The problem with the clause is that it excludes people in partnerships that are not akin to marriage. Indeed, the Bill talks about partnerships in precisely those terms. That not only raises the issue of siblings, as he said, but highlights the real problem with succession in respect of adult children.
 Most of us will have experienced constituency cases of the kind to which my hon. Friend the Member for South-West Bedfordshire referred. I am not prone to personal anecdotes, although it has become rather common to tell them in this Committee, but during my idyllic childhood growing up on a council estate in the golden age, my neighbours found themselves in precisely the circumstances that my hon. Friend described. A woman who lived with her elderly father until he died could not secure the tenancy of their council house for precisely the reasons described by both hon. Members who have spoken. 
 The clause is imperfect, and the amendment is not wide enough to deal with all the issues. It goes some way to addressing them by focusing on siblings but, as has been pointed out, the problem goes wider than that. It extends, for example, to elderly people living together as friends in a relationship that is not a marriage. Two elderly gentlemen or ladies who are living together but who do not claim in any sense to be married and do not want to make that claim would be peculiarly disadvantaged. I acknowledge that these are complex and difficult issues, not least of definition, but we deserve some explanation. 
 The hon. Member for Ludlow usually plays the fuddled fiddle in the muddled middle. I believe that Aneurin Bevan said that of J.B. Priestley, but the Minister will correct me if I am wrong. However, the hon. Gentleman is rather less fuddled and muddled than usual, and so, possibly for the first time in all our deliberations, I can say, with appropriate solemnity, that I enthusiastically support his amendment.

Robert Syms: I agree with my hon. Friend and the hon. Members for Ludlow and for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Betts): the clause is too narrow. There are many other deserving cases, which is why we have a problem with the provision and why we will vote for the amendment if it is pressed to a vote. Imperfect though it is, we want to make it clear that we believe that there should be a proper review of the way in which tenancies are handled.

Keith Hill: The amendment would extend to siblings who are living together the same succession rights as those reserved for spouses, but only for Rent Act
 tenancies. I remind the Committee that, in the case of secure and introductory tenancies, siblings already have succession rights if they resided with the tenant for 12 months preceding the tenant's death. In the case of Rent Act tenancies, siblings have succession rights if they resided with the tenant for two years preceding the tenant's death. The amendment would remove the need for a sibling to establish that they resided with the tenant for a set period before the tenant's death. Going down that path could open the doors to all siblings living with tenants, however transitorily, if they happened to be residing in the property when the tenant died.
 Siblings may live with each other for many reasons, whereas spouses and life partners live together because they intend to make their home together. It is right and proper to give succession rights to siblings who have resided in the property for some time, as there is evidence that they have made a home with the tenant. It is difficult to argue the same for siblings who do not meet that test of residence. The problem is that if the net is drawn too widely, or if there are insufficient safeguards, landlords will rarely get their property back after the course of one person's lifetime, and will regularly have to wait for two lifetimes to pass before doing so. In addition, if siblings are given succession rights that are similar to spouses, why not give such rights to cousins, or more distant relatives, or friends, or anyone else who shares accommodation? They may well be dependent on each other and share their home for a lengthy period. Why stop at siblings? 
 We cannot legislate for every possible permutation of living arrangement. The line has to be drawn somewhere. The most distinctive line is between committed partnerships, where there is a clear intention for the parties to form a home together, and all other relationships.

Mark Field: Although I class myself as being on the socially liberal wing of my party, I acknowledge that there is a measure of logic in saying that the one commitment is the commitment of marriage, and that that is therefore a logical dividing line when dealing with tenancies; there can be no doubt about that relationship. However, Conservative members of the Committee feel that the clause does not go anything like far enough. There might be uncertainty and the amendment would open the way to abuse—the Minister is right about—but I implore him to look further at the clause to try to find some form of words that takes account of the arguments made by my hon. Friends and the hon. Member for Ludlow.
 I fear that it is not logical to say that the line is drawn where it is for the purposes of certainty. Certainty would suggest either marriage or some other legal contract as the defining point. I would regard that as far too narrow, but so are the current arrangements, and I would like a much broader expansion. I hope that the Minister will give the measure serious consideration, if not necessarily in the course of this debate, at least before Report and Third Reading.

Keith Hill: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's observations, and I am not unsympathetic to the underlying concern that informs them and which I think is generally shared within the Committee. In this Committee, we have not only the progressive party of politics and the party in the middle, but—with people such as the hon. Gentleman present—a singularly socially liberal group of Conservative Members of Parliament.

John Hayes: Let me make clear that I have not got a socially liberal bone in my body. My colleagues can speak for themselves, but I know that at least one or two of them would be close to that position.

Keith Hill: Well, four socially liberal Conservatives and one compassionate Conservative.
 I understand the argument and I want to say something more about our possible longer-term approach on these matters. I maintain that the line must be drawn somewhere and that the most distinctive line is between committed partnerships, where there is a clear intention for the parties to form a home together, and all other relationships. The Government believe that siblings generally do not have a case for being recognised on the same basis as a couple. They already have a legally recognised relationship and their rights reflect that relationship. 
 I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe raised the issue of adult children who may not be able to succeed to the tenancies of their home, even though they have known no other. Each of us, as a constituency MP, has come across those tragic cases on more than one occasion in our advice surgeries. Let me state the Government's stance on the matter, and again, as in my response to the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr. Field), say something about a longer-term approach. 
 Children might not be able to succeed to the tenancies of their homes because, as my hon. Friend knows, it is at the landlord's discretion whether to grant further successions than those stipulated in the legislation. The fact is that landlord's stock may be subject to heavy demand, and the surviving child might not have as great a housing need as others. It might be that the child is left as the sole occupant of a family home, which could house another entire family as it once housed the child's. The landlord, although not granting the child a further succession, may offer them alternative, smaller, accommodation. 
 Such a situation can be a source of enormous upset when it arises, especially when the parents held a joint tenancy, one has died and the child has not realised that the remaining parent had succeeded to the tenancy—thus exhausting the right of succession. My hon. Friend alluded to Government guidance on that area. That recommends that housing authorities consider granting a tenancy to the remaining person or persons either in the same home or in suitable alternative accommodation, provided that the allocation has no adverse implications for the good use of the housing stock and has sufficient priority under the allocation scheme. 
 My experience as a Member of Parliament for a constituency covering an extremely hard-pressed inner-London authority is that authorities generally try to act with a degree of sympathy towards the tenant in such a situation. Other offers are made, but the trouble is that if someone has lived in a particular place all their life, they consider it their home and they are understandably reluctant to move to smaller accommodation in a different, perhaps less salubrious, area. However, the authority is between a rock and a hard place. There is desperate housing demand in London and other major cities, and that demand must be addressed. The under-occupancy rate in council housing stock is already sizeable—the figure is about 8 or 9 per cent. in London—so it is clear that there are strong pressures on local authorities. 
 I agree that inequalities in legislation should be addressed. That is why we are amending the provisions on the rules for succession to tenancies so that they will apply to same-sex couples. I do not want to belittle the work of making further amendments, as the hon. Members for Ludlow and for South-West Bedfordshire suggested, to address inequality, but there is a difference. The provisions on same-sex couples that I mentioned are in direct response to a specific recommendation from the Select Committee and in furtherance of a Government commitment in the housing Green Paper. 
 The Bill is already very long. Although it could be argued that the amendment falls within its scope, to agree to it would lead to the argument that we should take the opportunity to amend all other housing legislation that contains the same inequality, which would add considerably to the length of the Bill. And why stop here? Why not do something about the inequalities in all other legislation?

Edward Davey: The Minister may have a point. The Bill is long, and we hope that it will be made longer by our adding some new clauses. However, the Government have proposed a civil partnerships Bill, which will address one particular area. Will the Minister consult his ministerial colleagues to see whether the issue could be debated and dealt with in the context of that Bill, which is taking in overarching aspects of the rights of same-sex couples?

Keith Hill: I appreciate the constructive nature of that proposal, but I doubt whether there will be an opportunity for innovative legislation to be included in a Bill that is about to start its passage through the House. It seems more appropriate to carry out a separate exercise to address all issues of inequality in housing. We are expecting the draft tenure review Bill from the Law Commission later this year, and if we are inclined to follow the legislative route, that might provide such an opportunity.
 There is a separate issue of discrimination between the position of spouses and unmarried couples, which occurs throughout the statute book. The difference in treatment is not always consistent and is often the result of historical accident. Given that there are inequalities between same-sex partners, different-sex 
 partners and married people throughout legislation, the Government may want to consider the appropriateness of a Government-wide equalities Bill to take the issue forward. That would be a large piece of work and something that we would have to consider carefully. 
 I hope that I have demonstrated to the Committee open-mindedness and a recognition of the issues. However, I am not in any position to make commitments at this stage. I have tried to answer all the points made by hon. Members as comprehensively and sympathetically as possible, and I hope that, considering that, the hon. Member for Ludlow will withdraw the amendment.

John Hayes: I rise to make a brief point. I did not intervene on the Minister to make it, as he was making a measured, closely worded and considered response. However, there is a second issue: the clause does not only disadvantage siblings and adult children. I acknowledge what he said about time frames of residence, but the provision also disadvantages same-sex couples who are not
''in a relationship equivalent to that of husband and wife.'' 
There will be same-sex couples—such as elderly widows or widowers, or elderly spinsters or bachelors—who are not in a relationship equivalent to a marriage. They are of the same sex, but not in that kind of relationship. It would be wrong if two elderly spinsters had to pretend that they were in a kind of marriage in order to benefit from the Bill's provisions. It does not even deal reasonably with same-sex couples. There are even more profound problems with the clause, which the amendment would go some way to address. I am grateful for the Minister's tolerance and open-mindedness, but there are very profound worries about the clause.

Clive Betts: The clause does not disadvantage anybody: it removes an anomaly and a piece of discrimination that has existed for too long. What it does not do is remove every other anomaly in the rules on succession. Some of those have been referred to in the debate, and I thank the Minister for his response to them. He went through the pros and cons of some of the issues and indicated that he was prepared to have a wider review then the general consideration of tenure that will result from the Law Commission's work. That is the right way forward: we should support the clause, which removes one anomalous piece of discrimination, then look to the review to deal with the others.

Matthew Green: I listened to the Minister with some care, and he gave some reassurances, but there are still some questions to be asked. I support clause 165, but its effect is that one group of people will now have fewer rights than others: people who are related to one other closely enough that they cannot by law be in a sexual relationship. After all, cousins—even same-sex cousins—could claim that they were in a sexual relationship.

John Hayes: They should not have to.

Matthew Green: No, they should not have to, but the legislation would allow them to claim that. However, a brother and sister, or two brothers or two sisters, cannot; sons and daughters, and grandchildren cannot. They are restricted by law from claiming that right. Everybody else, provided that they are adults, can claim that they fit in to one of those circumstances.

Sally Keeble: They have to prove it.

Matthew Green: After someone has died, proving anything is difficult. The Minister has unintentionally created another anomaly.
 The danger of legislating is that as a loophole is closed, an oddity is created. People who are closely related to one another will now have fewer rights than people in every other set of circumstances. The Minister has acknowledged that difficulty. It would be remiss of the Committee if we passed the clause without taking the opportunity of testing the waters. The amendment is imperfect, because it only covers siblings, not children, or grandchildren, or cousins, for the reasons that I have explained. 
 This is not a point on which we should simply accept the Minister's assurance that it will all be dealt with. It will be helpful if members of the Committee indicate where they stand on the issue. I intend to press the amendment to a Division. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Vera Baird: I rise to ask for clarification about an issue that has been drawn to my attention primarily by Shelter, which is complicated—at least for me.
 Clause 165 gives unmarried and different-sex partners and same-sex partners the same rights, but the kinds of tenants who are referred to in subsections (1) and (3) seem to get different sets of rights, whereas the kinds of tenants referred to in subsections (2) and (4) get an inferior set of rights. Subsection (1) provides that a person will be 
''treated as the spouse of the . . . tenant if''
they are living with them as husband or wife, or if they are in a same-sex ''equivalent relationship''. That is a fine and full recognition of the equivalence. The same thing happens in subsection (3), under which someone would be treated as a spouse if they were living as husband or wife, or in a same-sex relationship that is equivalent to that of husband and wife. 
 Subsection (1) covers a Rent Act tenant and subsection (3) covers an assured tenant. Subsection (2) says that a 
'''member of the tenant's family' includes . . . a person who'' 
is living together as husband and wife with the tenant, or is in an equivalent same-sex relationship. Subsection (2) says that an unmarried partner of either sex is treated as a member of the tenant's family, not as a spouse. Subsection (4) says the same thing. Subsections (2) and (4) cover introductory and secure tenancies. Subsection (4) does not say that ''a person of either sex living together is a spouse'', but that they are just a 
'''member of the tenant's family'''. 
To succeed in that regard and be treated as a member of the tenant's family, such people must have resided continuously with the tenant for the past 12 months. That puts those who are succeeding under subsections (2) and (4) in a lesser position than that of marrieds and those who succeed under subsections (1) and (3). 
 To be treated as a 
'''member of the tenant's family''' 
would also, although I do not know this—I am relying entirely on the briefing—put a deceased partner behind an estranged spouse. That would put the partner on a level with other family members who might have lived there for 12 months, and that might cause difficulties. If there is a clash, the landlord will decide who succeeds, and that might not be satisfactory. Was it the Government's intention to give two categories of rights to the same set of people, contingent on the kind of tenancy that exists?

Matthew Green: I wish to support the hon. and learned Lady. As eagled-eyed Committee members will have noticed, I was somewhat slow in tabling a couple of amendments along these lines, and we have made such rapid progress today that we will not be able to discuss them as they were rightly starred. I am glad that the hon. and learned Lady raised exactly the point that my two amendments were designed to prompt. The Minister has some explaining to do.

John Hayes: It seems to me that the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) and the hon. Member for Ludlow hit upon an important point of consistency. I suspect that, in attempting to introduce a provision, sections have been taken from the original Act that do not marry terribly well. I am sure that the Minister will want to assure us that that will be dealt with during the further passage of the Bill.

Keith Hill: I am, as ever, grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar for raising an important matter, which has stimulated an interesting
 and energetic—not to say frantic—response on my part. I hope to be able to offer some explanation of the clause's contents. 
 My hon. and learned Friend raised the point that the civil partnerships Bill will allow same-sex partners to succeed as partners. The issue of tenures and rights is complicated. The existing tenure succession is already different among secure, assured and Rent Act tenancies, and members of families have different rights from spouses in any circumstances. I cannot, of course, pray in aid a visual representation, but I have in my hand a document that sets out succession rights across the three tenancies. There are 14 or 15 variations in tenancy rights within those categories. 
 There is an argument for regularising the situation. I imagine that that will certainly be one of the purposes of the Law Commission's work on tenure, to which we have referred frequently during our discussions. However, my basic point in connection with same-sex partners, which is the subject and purpose of the clause, is that we have sought to equalise same-sex rights to fit in with the different tenure regimes. That is the clause's purpose, although I fully admit that there may be other issues about wider family rights that have not been addressed in the Bill.

John Hayes: I was waiting to see whether the hon. and learned Lady wanted to rise, as I am in anticipation of her further comment.
 I am not entirely convinced by the Minister. He suggests that the reason for the disparity between subsections (1) and (3) and subsections (2) and (4) is that they apply to different kinds of tenancies. That seemed to be the implication of what he said. He said that the complexities that apply to the different types of tenancies and the different familial relationships in respect of those tenancies explain the apparent discrepancy. I am not sure that that is right. I cannot see that subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4) clearly delineate different situations, either in terms of the familial relationship or the type of tenancy. The argument that he is spinning seems a bit thin. I do not know what the hon. and learned Member for Redcar thinks, but that is my impression of the case that the Minister has made. Perhaps it is something that we can come back to later.

Vera Baird: As I understand it, they are separated. Subsections (2) and (4) are about different kinds of tenancy from subsections (1) and (3). I think that I am starting to grasp what the Minister is saying about the rationale behind the clause. I see that the primary purpose is to put husband and wife equivalents in the same position—by that, I mean opposite-sex partners and same-sex partners. It still gives a hierarchy of rights to people who should be in the same position. It is unfortunate that someone does not have the same rights to succeed because of what might be just an accident in the nature of the tenancy.

Clive Betts: Does my hon. and learned Friend accept that the key point—I do not think that the Minister has quite addressed it—is that although there may be
 different rules and law under subsections (2) and (4), surely under the succession arrangements for the types of tenancy to which those subsections apply, a wife or a husband would not be treated as a member of the family; they would be given a different place in terms of succession? If the amendments were accepted, they would not give a same-sex partner a different relationship, in terms of succession, from a member of the family.

Vera Baird: Although that is right, it seems to me that it goes a little wider. It does not give a spouse—whether same sex or opposite sex—the same right as a married person in connection with those two tenancies. With the other two kinds of tenancy, it gives them the same rights. It seems odd that although the intent is to give everyone equal rights, the effect is to give two sets of people unequal rights just because of the accident of the kind of tenancy that they have. The long-stop answer that the Law Commission might put it right in a couple of hundred years is not fantastically satisfactory.
 Amendments were proposed that appeared in my elementary judgment to be perfectly easy. However, as the hon. Member for Ludlow said, they are starred and could not be carried through. I invite the Minister to consider whether amendments Nos. 455 and 456 might not meet the case and ensure what I am sure he set out to do, which is to give everybody the same rights as married people whatever the nature of the tenancy.

Matthew Green: I do not have the Rent Act 1977, the Housing Act 1988 or the Housing Act 1996 in front of me, but I do have the Housing Act 1985, which is referred to in subsection (2) and is one of these slight aberrations. The more I read it, the more I regret not getting those amendments down on Tuesday, because section 87 of the 1985 Act, entitled ''Succession on death of a tenant'' and referred to by clause 165(2), is actually quite a small clause. If I read it aloud, it will make it clear that subsection (2) could easily have referred to a spouse rather than a member of the family.
 ''A person is qualified to succeed the tenant under a secure tenancy if he occupies the dwelling-house as his only or principal home at the time of the tenant's death and either—(a) is the tenant's spouse, or (b) he is another member of the tenant's family and resided with the tenant throughout the period of twelve months ending with the tenant's death; unless, in either case, the tenant was himself a successor, as defined in section 88''— 
the problem of the second succession. The way that the Government have framed the subsection, it would not make any difference whether they are a member of the family or a spouse. For equal reasons, the Government could have framed it the other way around, which would make more sense in the reading of it for same-sex partners. The Government could easily have framed subsections (2) and (4)—certainly subsection (2); I cannot comment specifically on subsection (4) because I do not have the Act in front of me—in exactly the same way as subsections (1) and (3). That would have made no practical difference at all and would have avoided the problem of appearing to give different treatment to same-sex couples compared with married couples.

John Hayes: That, in a clumsy way, is the point that I was trying to make. In the various Acts referred to, the relationship of either family member or spouse could be applied in any of those circumstances. In two cases the Government have aligned same-sex partners with spouses, and in another two cases—although they could have done the same—they have aligned such partners with family members. I have had two looks at the Acts concerned; I am reading from the same section of the 1985 Act as the hon. Gentleman. His point is well made, and I am sure that the Minister will want to clear that up.
Vera Baird rose—

John Hayes: I give way.

Derek Conway: Order. The hon. Gentleman is making a long intervention on the hon. Member for Ludlow; it is not possible for him to give way to someone else. Before the Committee continues, I remind hon. Members that amendments Nos. 455 and 456, starred on the amendment paper, were not selected. Although I am happy for the debate to cover clause 165 generally, I hope that the Minister will not be tempted into responding as if those amendments were being considered, because they most definitely are not.

Matthew Green: I was taking great care not to refer to those amendments; I was referring to the fact that the Government could have phrased subsection (2) like subsection (1). The fact that my amendment has not been selected is a different matter.
 Did the hon. and learned Member for Redcar want to intervene on me?

Vera Baird: No, I wanted to intervene on the hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings in case he had the Housing Act 1996 with him as well. Subsection (4) is about the 1996 Act; we need to establish whether the same pattern that the hon. Member for Ludlow has pinpointed in the 1985 Act is replicated there.

John Hayes: I shall try to get it.

Matthew Green: I thank the hon. and learned Lady for that wise intervention; clearly it is not helpful when one gets a clause referring to four different Acts in the space of about 20 sentences.
 To satisfy the Committee and to prevent the matter coming back again, the Minister needs to explain how it would have made any difference if subsection (2) had been framed as subsection (1). Reading the 1985 Act, I cannot see that it would have made any difference at all. The whole thrust of the Government's legislation is to treat same-sex couples as though they were spouses; the Government could easily have framed the subsections in that way. The Minister might want to spend a little time exploring why he has ended up with that wording.

Keith Hill: I begin to feel that the Committee is losing sight of the very decent purpose, designed to secure the succession rights of same-sex tenancies, that is set out in the Bill. I reiterate that the civil
 partnerships Bill will allow same-sex couples to succeed as spouses. We are dealing with an accumulation of legislation, but let me say to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar that the Government are seized of those tenure issues and of the complexities of legislation that may have been designed at different times to serve different purposes. That is why we look forward to the findings of the Law Commission. I will not be here in 200 years' time, but its findings will be published in the spring. The Government will respond to them with considerable interest.
 I must also say that it is difficult for me, as a Minister, to deal with proposed amendments that have not been selected. In those circumstances, the Committee will have to forgive me for not having an obvious answer. I hope that it will satisfy the Committee if I say that I have listened to the debate with great care and that I shall consider these matters and, if necessary, come forward with further proposals.

John Hayes: The glint of Mack the Knife's blade is beginning to flash before the Committee again, so I had better keep my remarks brief.
 There are real uncertainties about this clause. The specific points raised by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar are important. However, in making our judgment about the clause, we return to the fundamental issues about the unreasonableness of applying certain conditions to certain groups while implicitly excluding other groups that might in some 
 people's eyes be deemed to be equally deserving. We have had a long debate about that, and I do not want to extend it. 
 I would have loved to be able to quote from the 1996 Act—which is winging its way towards me, but not fast enough—and all the other legislation that is referred to in detail in this clause. However, on the basis of what I have said, I have to recommend to Conservative Committee members that we vote against this clause. 
 Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 12, Noes 5.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 165 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Paul Clark.] 
Adjourned accordingly at twelve minutes past Four o'clock till Tuesday 24 February at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.